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Optimal Feature Manipulation Attacks Against
Linear Regression
Fuwei Li, Lifeng Lai, and Shuguang Cui
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate how to manipulate the
coefficients obtained via linear regression by adding carefully
designed poisoning data points to the dataset or modify the
original data points. Given the energy budget, we first provide
the closed-form solution of the optimal poisoning data point when
our target is modifying one designated regression coefficient. We
then extend the analysis to the more challenging scenario where
the attacker aims to change one particular regression coefficient
while making others to be changed as small as possible. For
this scenario, we introduce a semidefinite relaxation method to
design the best attack scheme. Finally, we study a more powerful
adversary who can perform a rank-one modification on the
feature matrix. We propose an alternating optimization method
to find the optimal rank-one modification matrix. Numerical
examples are provided to illustrate the analytical results obtained
in this paper.
Index Terms—Linear regression, adversarial robustness, poi-
soning attack, non-convex optimization.
I. INTRODUCTION
Linear regression plays a fundamental role in machine
learning and is used in a wide spectrum of applications [1]–
[5]. In linear regression, one assume that there is a simple
linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the
response variable. The goal of linear regression is to find out
the regression coefficients through the methods of ordinary
least square (OLS), ridge regression, Lasso [6], etc. Having the
regression coefficients learned from the data points, one can
predict the response values given the values of the explanatory
variables. The regression coefficients also help us explain the
variation in the response variable that can be attributed to
the variation in the explanatory variables. It can quantify the
strength of the relationship between certain explanatory vari-
ables and the response variable. Large magnitude of the regres-
sion coefficient usually indicates a strong relationship while
small valued regression coefficient means a weak relationship.
This is especially true when linear regression is accomplished
by the parameter regularized method such as ridge regression
and Lasso. In addition, the sign of the regression coefficients
indicates whether the value of the response variable increases
or decreases when the value of a explanatory variable changes,
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which is very important in biologic science [7], financial
analysis [8], and environmental science [9].
Machine learning is being used in various applications, in-
cluding security and safety critical applications such as medi-
cal image analysis [10] and autonomous driving [11]. For these
applications, it is important to understand the robustness of
machine learning algorithms in adversarial environments [12]–
[14]. In such an environment, there may exist a malicious
adversary who has the full knowledge of the machine learning
system and has the ability to observe the whole data points.
After seeing the data points, the adversary can add some
carefully designed poisoning data points or directly modify
the data points so as to corrupt the learning system or leave a
backdoor in this system [15].
The goal of this paper is to investigate the optimal way
to attack linear regression methods. In the considered linear
regression system, there exists an adversary who can observe
the whole dataset and then inject carefully designed poisoning
data points or directly modify the original dataset in order
to manipulate the regression coefficients. The manipulated
regression coefficients can later be used by the adversary as a
backdoor of this learning system or mislead our interpretation
of the linear regression model. For example, by changing a
large magnitude regression coefficient to be small, it makes
us believe that its corresponding explanatory variable is ir-
relevant. Similarly, the adversary can change the magnitude
of a regression coefficient to a larger value to increase its
importance. Furthermore, changing the sign of a regression
coefficient can also lead us to misinterpret the correlation
between its explanatory variable and the response variable.
Depending on the objective of the adversary and the way
the adversary changes the regression coefficients, we have
different problem formulations. We first consider a scenario
where the adversary tries to manipulate one specific regression
coefficient by adding one carefully designed poisoning data
point that has limited energy budget to the dataset. We show
that finding the optimal attack data point is equivalent to
solve an optimization problem where the objective function
is a ratio of two quadratic functions and the constraint is a
quadratic inequality. Even though this type of problem is non-
convex in general, our particular problem has a hidden convex
structure. With the help of this convex structure, we further
convert the optimization problem into a quadratic constrained
quadratic program (QCQP). Since it is known that strong
duality exists in this problem [16], we are able to identify its
closed-from optimal solutions from its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
(KKT) conditions.
We next consider a more sophisticated objective where the
attacker aims to change one particular regression coefficient
while making others to be changed as small as possible. We
show that the problem of finding the optimal attack data point
is equivalent to solving an optimization problem where the
objective function is a ratio of two fourth order multivariate
polynomials and the constraint is quadratic. This optimization
problem is much more complex than the optimization above.
We introduce a semidefinite relaxation method to solve this
problem. The numerical examples show that we can find the
global optimal solutions with very low relaxation order. Hence,
the complexity of this method is low in practical problems.
Finally, we consider a more powerful adversary who can
directly modify the existing data points in the feature matrix.
Particularly, we consider a rank-one modification attack [17],
where the attacker carefully designs a rank-one matrix and
adds it to the existing data matrix. A rank-one modification
attack is general enough to capture most of the common
modifications, such as modifying one feature, deleting or
adding one data point, changing one entry of the data matrix,
etc. Hence, studying the rank-one modification provides us
universal bounds on these kinds of attacks. By leveraging
the rank-one structure, we develop an alternating optimization
method to find the optimal modification matrix. We also prove
that the solution obtained by the proposed optimization method
is one of the critical points of the optimization problem.
Our study is related to several recent works on the ad-
versarial machine learning. For example, Pimentel-Alarco´n et
al. studied how to add one adversarial data point in order
to maximize the error of the subspace estimated by principal
component [18], Li et al. studied the adversarial robustness of
subspace learning problem [17], and Alfeld et al. considered
how to use poisoning data points to attack the auto regression
model [19]. The work that is most relevant to our paper
is [20], where the authors develop a bi-level optimization
framework to design the attack matrix. [20] further proposes
to use the projected gradient descent method to solve the
bi-level optimization problem. However, a general bi-level
problem is known to be NP hard and solving it depends
on the convexity of the lower level problem. In addition,
the convergence of projected gradient descent for non-convex
problem is not clear. Compared with [20], we obtain the
global optimal solution for the case with adding one poisoning
data point, and we also prove that the proposed alternating
optimization method converges to one of the critical points for
the case where the attacker can perform rank-one modification
attack. Furthermore, for the projected gradient descent method,
different datasets may need different parameters, which makes
the parameters of this algorithm hard to tune. By contrast,
we provide closed-form solution for the case with adding
one poisoning data point to attack one of the regression
coefficients, and the designed alternating optimization method
for the case of rank-one attack does not need parameter tuning.
Furthermore, compared with the projected gradient descent
method, our alternating optimization method provides smaller
objective values, faster convergence rate, and more stable
behavior.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we consider the scenario where the attack add
one carefully designed poisoning data point to the dataset.
In Section III, we investigate the rank-one attack strategy.
Numerical examples are provided in Section IV to illustrate
the results we obtained in this paper. Finally, we provide
concluding remarks in Section V.
II. ATTACKING WITH ONE ADVERSARIAL DATA POINT
In this section, we consider the scenario where the attacker
can add one carefully crafted data point to the existing dataset.
We will extend the analysis to the case with more sophisticated
attacks in Section III.
A. Problem formulation
Consider a dataset with n data samples, {yi,xi}ni=1, where
yi is the response variable, xi ∈ Rm is the feature vec-
tor, where each component of xi represents an explana-
tory variable. In this section, we consider an adversarial
setup in which the adversary first observes the the whole
dataset {y,X}, in which y := [y1, y2, . . . , yn]⊤ and X :=
[x1, x2, . . . ,xn]
⊤, and then carefully designs an adversarial
data point, {y0,x0}, and adds it into the existing data sam-
ples. After inserting this adversarial data point, we have the
poisoned dataset {yˆ, Xˆ}, where yˆ := [y0, y1, y2, . . . , yn]⊤,
Xˆ := [x0, x1,x2, . . . ,xn]
⊤.
From the dataset, we intend to learn a linear regression
model. From the poisoned dataset, the learned model is
obtained by solving
argmin
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2, (1)
where ‖·‖ denotes the ℓ2 norm for a vector and the induced 2-
norm for a matrix throughout this paper. Let βˆ be the optimal
solution to problem (1). The goal of the adversary is to min-
imize some objective function, f(βˆ), by carefully designing
the adversarial data point. The form of f(βˆ) depends on the
specific goal of the attacker. For example, the attacker can try
to reduce the importance of feature i by setting f(βˆ) = |βˆi|, in
which βˆi is the ith component of βˆ. Or the attacker can try to
increase the importance of feature i by setting f(βˆ) = −|βˆi|.
To make the problem meaningful, in this paper, we impose
the energy constraint on the adversarial data point and use the
ℓ2 norm to measure its energy. With the objective f(βˆ) and
the energy constraint of the adversary data point, our problem
can be formulated as
min
‖[x⊤
0
,y0]‖≤η
: f(βˆ) (2)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2,
where η is the energy budget. This is a complicated bi-level
optimization problem. The objective function, f(βˆ), depends
on the poisoning data point, {x0, y0}, not in a direct way,
but through a lower level optimization problem. What makes
this problem even harder is the complication of the objective
function. Depending on the goal of the adversary, the objective
can be in various of forms. In the following two subsections,
we will discuss two important objectives and their solutions,
respectively. The methods and insights obtained from these
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two cases could be then be extended to cases with other
objectives.
B. Attacking one regression coefficient
In this subsection, the goal of the adversary is to design the
adversarial data point {y0,x0} to decrease (or increase) the
importance of a certain explanatory variable. If the goal is to
decrease the importance of explanatory variable i, we can set
f(βˆ) = |βˆi|, and the optimization problem can be written as
min
‖[x⊤
0
, y0]‖2≤η
: |βˆi| (3)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2.
Similarly, if the goal of the adversary is to increase the im-
portance of explanatory variable i, we can set f(βˆ) = −|βˆi|,
and we have the optimization problem
min
‖[x⊤
0
, y0]‖≤η
: − |βˆi| (4)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2.
To solve the complicated bi-level optimization problems
problems (3) and (4), we first solve the following two op-
timization problems
min
‖[x⊤
0
, y0]‖≤η
: βˆi (5)
s.t. βˆ = min
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2, (6)
and
max
‖[x⊤
0
, y0]‖≤η
: βˆi (7)
s.t. βˆ = min
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2. (8)
It is easy to check that the solutions to problems (3) and (4)
can be obtained from the solutions to problem (5) and (7).
In particular, let (βˆ∗i )min and (βˆ
∗
i )max be optimal values of
problem (5) and (7) respectively. Then, if βˆi ≥ 0, we can
check that max{0, (βˆ∗i )min} and max{|(βˆ∗i )min|, |(βˆ∗i )max|}
are the solutions to problem (3) and (4) respectively. Similar
arguments can be made if βˆi < 0.
In the following, we will focus on solving the minimization
problem (5). The solution to the maximization problem (7)
can be obtained by using a similar approach. To solve this bi-
level optimization problem, we can first solve the optimization
problem in the subjective. Problem (6) is just an ordinary least
squares problem, which has a simple closed-form solution:
βˆ = (Xˆ⊤Xˆ)−1Xˆ⊤yˆ. Substitute in Xˆ = [x0,X
⊤]⊤ and yˆ =
[y0,y
⊤]⊤, and we have
βˆ = (X⊤X+ x0x
⊤
0 )
−1[x0,X
⊤][y0,y
⊤]⊤.
According to the Sherman-Morrison formula [21], we have
(X⊤X+ x0x
⊤
0 )
−1
= (X⊤X)−1 − (X
⊤X)−1x0x
⊤
0 (X
⊤X)−1
1 + x⊤0 (X
⊤X)−1x0
.
The inverse of X⊤X + x0x
⊤
0 always exists because 1 +
x⊤0 (X
⊤X)−1x0 6= 0. Plug this inverse in the expression of
βˆ, we get
βˆ = β0 +
Ax0(y0 − x⊤0 β0)
1 + x⊤0 Ax0
, (9)
where
A = (X⊤X)−1, (10)
β0 = (X
⊤X)−1X⊤y. (11)
We can observe that β0 is the coefficient that is obtained from
the clean data. Problem (5) is equivalent to
min
x0,y0
:
a⊤x0(y0 − x⊤0 β0)
1 + x⊤0 Ax0
(12)
s.t. ‖[x⊤0 , y0]‖ ≤ η, (13)
where a is the ith column ofA. The optimization problem (12)
is the ratio of two quadratic functions with a quadratic con-
straint. To further simplify this optimization problem, we can
write our objective and subjective in a more compact form
by performing variable change: u = [x⊤0 , y0]
⊤. Using this
compact representation, the optimization problem (12) can be
written as
min :
u
1
2u
⊤Hu
1 + u⊤[ A 0
0 0 ]u
(14)
s.t. u⊤u ≤ η2,
in which
H =
[−aβ⊤0 − β0a⊤ a
a⊤ 0
]
. (15)
(14) is a non-convex optimization problem. To solve this
problem, we employ the technique introduced in [22]. We first
perform variable change u = zs by introducing variable z and
scalar s. Inserting this into problem (14), adding constraint
1 to the denominator of the objective and moving it to the
subjective, we have a new optimization problem
min
z,s
:
1
2
z⊤Hz (16)
s.t. s2 + z⊤[ A 0
0 0 ]z = 1, (17)
z⊤z ≤ s2η2. (18)
To validate the equivalence between problem (14) and (16),
we only need to check if the optimal value of problem (14) is
less than the optimal value of problem (16) when s = 0 [22].
Firstly, since H is not positive semi-definite (which will be
shown later), the optimal value of problem (14) is less than
zero. Secondly, when s = 0, the optimal value of problem (16)
is zero, which is apparently larger than the optimal value of
problem (14). Therefore, the two problems are equivalent.
To solve problem (16), we substitute s2 in equation (17) for
that in equation (18) and obtain
min
z
:
1
2
z⊤Hz (19)
s.t. z⊤
(
I+ η2[ A 0
0 0 ]
)
z ≤ η2. (20)
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Note that H is not positive semi-definite; hence problem (19)
is not a standard convex QCQP problem [16]. However, it
is proved that strong duality holds for this type of prob-
lem [16], [23]. Hence, to solve this problem, we can start by
investigating its KKT necessary conditions. The Lagrangian
of problem (19) is
L(z, λ) = 1
2
z⊤Hz+ λ
(
z⊤
(
I+ η2[ A 0
0 0 ]
)
z− η2) ,
where λ is the dual variable. According to the KKT conditions,
we have
(H+ λD) z = 0, (21)
1
2
z⊤Dz ≤ η2, (22)
λ
(
1
2
z⊤Dz− η2
)
= 0, (23)
λ ≥ 0, (24)
where
D = 2
(
I+ η2
[
A 0
0 0
])
. (25)
By inspecting the complementary slackness condition (23),
we consider two cases based on the value of λ.
Case 1: λ = 0. In this case, we must have Hz = 0. As a
result, the objective value of (19) is zero, which contradicts
the fact that the optimal value should be negative. Hence, this
case is not possible.
Case 2: λ > 0. In this case, equality in (22) must hold.
According to the stationary condition (21), if the matrix
H+λD is full rank, we must have z = 0, for which equality
in (22) cannot hold. Hence, H+ λD is not full-rank and we
have det(H + λD) = 0. As D is positive definite, we also
have
det(D−1/2HD−1/2 + λI) = 0. (26)
Since λ > 0, this equality tells us that −λ belongs to one of the
negative eigenvalues of D−1/2HD−1/2. In the following, we
will show that D−1/2HD−1/2 has one and only one negative
eigenvalue.
By definition, D is a block diagonal matrix. Hence, its
inverse is also block diagonal. Let us define D−1/2 =
diag{G, g}, where G = 1/√2(I+ η2A)−1/2 and g = 1/√2.
Thus, we have
D−1/2HD−1/2 =
[ −ch⊤ − hc⊤ gc
gc⊤ 0
]
,
where c = Ga and h = Gβ0. Define ξ as the eigenvalue of
D−1/2HD−1/2, and compute its eigenvalues by computing
the characteristic polynomial:
det
(
ξI−D−1/2HD−1/2
)
= ξm−1
(
ξ2 + 2ξc⊤h+ c⊤hh⊤c− g2c⊤c− c⊤ch⊤h) .
Thus, the eigenvalues of D−1/2HD−1/2 are ξ = 0 ((m-1)
multiplications) and ξ = −c⊤h ± ‖c‖
√
g2 + h⊤h. Since
‖c‖
√
g2 + h⊤h > |c⊤h|, the eigenvalues of D−1/2HD−1/2
satisfy: ξm+1 < 0, ξm = ξm−1 = · · · = ξ2 = 0, ξ1 > 0.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Adversarial Data Point Design
1: Input: the data set, {yi,xi}ni=1, energy budget η, and the
index of feature to be attacked.
2: Steps:
3: compute A according to equation (10), compute β0 ac-
cording to (11).
4: computeH andD according to (15) and (25), respectively.
5: compute the last eigenvalue, ξm+1, ofD
−1/2HD−1/2 and
its corresponding eigenvector according to (27).
6: design the adversarial data point, {x0, y0}, according to
equations (28), (29), and (30).
7: Output: return the optimal adversarial data point {x0, y0}
and the optimal value η2ξm+1 + (β0)i.
Now, it is clear that D−1/2HD−1/2 has one and only one
negative eigenvalue and one positive eigenvalue, respectively.
Thus, we have λ = −ξm+1. Assume ν1 and νm+1 are
two eigenvectors corresponding to eigenvalues ξ1 and ξm+1.
Through simple calculation, we have
νi = ki
[
−c
⊤h+ ξi
c⊤c
c⊤ + h⊤,
gc⊤
ξi
(
−c
⊤h+ ξi
c⊤c
c+ h
)]⊤
,
(27)
where i = 1, m+1 and scalar ki is the normalization constant
to guarantee the eigenvectors to be of unit length. According
to (21), we have
(H+ λD) z = D1/2
(
D−1/2HD−1/2 + λI
)
D1/2z = 0;
thus the solution to problem (19) is
z∗ = k ·D−1/2νm+1. (28)
Since 12z
⊤Dz = η2, we have k =
√
2η. Having the expression
of the optimal z∗, we can then compute s according to
equation (17):
s = ±
√
1− (z∗1:m)⊤Az∗1:m, (29)
where z∗1:m is the vector that comprises the first m elements
of z∗. Hence, the corresponding solution to problem (12) is
x∗0 = z
∗
1:m/s, y
∗
0 = z
∗
m+1/s. (30)
We now compute the optimal value of problem (16). Since
our objective function is 12 (z
∗)⊤Hz∗, substituting z∗ in (28)
leads to the objective value: η2ν⊤m+1D
−1/2HD−1/2νm+1.
Since ν⊤m+1D
−1/2HD−1/2νm+1 = ξm+1, our optimal ob-
jective value is η2ξm+1.
Following similar analysis as above, we can find the optimal
z∗ for problem (7), which is z∗ =
√
2ηD−1/2ν1. Also, we
can compute the optimal x∗0 and y
∗
0 according to equation (30)
and its optimal objective value, which is η2ξ1.
In summary, the optimal values for problems (5) and (7)
are η2ξm+1 + (β0)i and η
2ξ1 + (β0)i respectively. We have
summarized the process to design the optimal adversarial
data point in Algorithm 1 with respect to objective (5) and
the process with respect to objective (7) can be obtained
accordingly. Based on our optimal values of problems (5) and
4
(7), we can further decide the optimal values of problems (3)
and (4) as discussed at the beginning of this section.
Moreover, if we use the ridge regression method in linear
regression, there is only a slight difference in the matrix A in
problem (12) and the whole analysis remains the same.
C. Attacking with small changes of other regression coeffi-
cients
In Section II-B, we have discussed how to design the adver-
sarial data points to attack one specific regression coefficient in
order to enhance or reduce the importance of its corresponding
explanatory variable. However, as we only focus on one
particular regression coefficient, other regression coefficients
may also be changed by the attack sample. In this subsection,
we consider a more complex objective function, where we
aim to make the changes to other regression coefficients to
be as small as possible while attacking one of the regression
coefficients.
Suppose our objective is to minimize the ith regression coef-
ficient (the scenario of maximize the ith regression coefficient
can be solved using similar approach), i.e., to minimize ‖βˆi‖2.
At the same time, we would also like to minimize the changes
to the rest of the regression coefficients, i.e., to minimize
‖β−i0 − βˆ
−i‖2, where β−i0 contains the original regression
coefficients except its ith element and βˆ
−i
consists of all the
elements of the regression coefficients excluding the ith one
after we insert the adversarial data sample. Combine the two
objectives, we have our new objective function
f(βˆ) =
1
2
∥∥∥β−i0 − βˆ−i
∥∥∥2 + λ
2
∥∥∥βˆi
∥∥∥2 ,
where λ is the trade-off parameter. The larger the λ is, the
more effort will be made to keep the ith regression coefficient
small. Similarly, a negative λ means the adversary attempts
to make the magnitude of the ith regression coefficient large.
Again, we assume that the attack energy budget is η. As the
result, we have the following optimization problem
min
‖[x⊤0 ,y0]‖≤η
:
1
2
∥∥∥β−i0 − βˆ−i
∥∥∥2 + λ
2
∥∥∥βˆi
∥∥∥2 (31)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖yˆ − Xˆβ‖2.
As the objective function is a quadratic function with respect to
βˆ, we can write it in a more compact form: 12 (βˆ−d)⊤Λ(βˆ−
d), where d = [β10 , β
2
0 , . . . , β
i−1
0 , 0, β
i+1
0 , . . . , β
m
0 ]
⊤ and
Λ = diag(1, 1, . . . , λ, . . . , 1). With this compact form, our
optimization problem can be written as
min
‖[x⊤0 ,y0]‖≤η
:
1
2
(βˆ − d)⊤Λ(βˆ − d) (32)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖yˆ− Xˆβ‖2.
To solve this problem, same as in the previous subsection, we
start by solving the lower level optimization problem. Since
we have the same lower level problem as in (5), substitute βˆ
in the objective with the expression (9), and we have the one
level optimization problem
min
x0,y0
:
1
2
g⊤Λg
s.t.
∥∥[x⊤0 , y0]∥∥ ≤ η,
where g =
Ax0(y0−x
⊤
0
β
0
)
1+x⊤
0
Ax0
− b, and b = d− β0 with A and
β0 defined in (10) and (11) respectively. To further simplify
our problem, let us define
A1 = [A,0], A2 =
[
A 0
0 0
]
, c =
[−β0
1
]
, z =
[
x0
y0
]
,
(33)
where A1 ∈ Rm×(m+1) and A2 ∈ R(m+1)×(m+1). With
the new defined variables, we can write our problem more
compactly as:
min
z
:
1
2
(
A1zc
⊤z
1 + z⊤A2z
− b
)⊤
Λ
(
A1zc
⊤z
1 + z⊤A2z
− b
)
(34)
s.t. ‖z‖ ≤ η.
Since the objective is a ratio of two quartic functions, similar
to the process we carried out from (14) to (16), we perform
variable change z = ws by introducing the new variable
w and scalar s. Insert it into problem (34) and follow the
same argument we have made to transform problem (14) to
problem (16), problem (34) is equivalent to the following
problem
min
w,s
:
1
2
(
A1wc
⊤w − b)⊤Λ (A1wc⊤w− b) (35)
s.t. (s2 +w⊤A2w)
2 = 1, (36)
w⊤w ≤ s2η2. (37)
According to the definition of A2, it is positive semidefinite.
Hence, we have s2 = 1−w⊤A2w. Plug in the expression of
s2 into (37), the constraints in problem (35) can be simplified
to w⊤(I+ η2A2)w ≤ η2. Assume I+ η2A2 = U⊤U is the
Cholesky decomposition of I + η2A2. Define H = A1U
−1,
e = U−⊤c, and x = Uw, we can simplify problem (35)
further as:
min
x
:
1
2
(
Hxe⊤x− b)⊤Λ (Hxe⊤x− b) (38)
s.t. x⊤x ≤ η2.
This is an optimization problem with a quartic objective
function and with quadratic constraint. Recent progress in
multivariate polynomial optimization has made it possible
to solve this problem using the sum of squares technology
[24]–[27]. This method finds the global optimal solutions
by solving a sequence of convex linear matrix inequality
problems. Even though this sequence might be infinitely long,
in practice, a very short sequence is enough to guarantee its
global optimality. Hence, in this subsection, we will resort to
Lasserre’s relaxation method [24]. In Appendix A, we briefly
discuss how to use this method to solve (38). Algorithm 2
summarizes the process to design the adversarial data point.
Numerical examples using this method to solve our problem
with real data will be provided in Section IV.
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Algorithm 2 Optimal Adversarial Data Point Design while
Making Small Changes to Other Regression Coefficients
1: Input: the data set, {yi,xi}ni=1, energy budget η, and the
index of feature to be attacked, the trade-off parameter λ.
2: Steps:
3: compute A according to equation (10), compute β0 ac-
cording to (11), compute A2 according to (33).
4: follow the steps (31), (32), (34), and (35), and formulate
our problem as a polynomial optimization problem (38).
5: use Lasserre’s relaxation method to solve problem (38)
and get the optimal solution x∗ and optimal value p∗.
6: compute w∗ = U⊤x∗, where I+ η2A2 = UU
⊤.
7: compute s∗ = ±
√
1− (w∗)⊤A2w∗.
8: calculate the optimal solution x∗0 = w
∗
1:m/s
∗, y∗0 =
w∗m+1/s
∗.
9: Output: return the optimal adversarial data point {y∗0 ,x∗0}
and the optimal value p∗.
III. RANK-ONE ATTACK ANALYSIS
In Section II, we have discussed how to design one ad-
versarial data point to attack the regression coefficients. In
this section, we consider a more powerful adversary who can
modify the whole dataset in order to attack the regression
coefficients. In particular, we will consider a rank-one attack
on the feature matrix [17]. This type of attack covers many
useful scenarios, for example, modifying one entry of the
feature matrix, deleting one feature, changing one feature or
replacing one feature etc. Hence, the analysis of the rank-one
attack provides a universal bound for all of these kinds of
modifications. Specifically, we will consider the objective in
problem (3) and (4) where the adversary attacks one particular
regression coefficient. In the following, we will first formulate
our problem and then provide our alternative optimization
method to solve this problem.
In the considered rank one attack model, the attacker will
carefully design a rank-one feature modification matrix∆ and
add it to the original feature matrix X. As the result, the
modified feature matrix is Xˆ = X+∆. As ∆ has rank one,
we can write ∆ = cd⊤. Similar to the previous section, we
restrict the adversary to having constrained energy budget, η.
Here, we use the Frobenius norm to measure the energy of
the modification matrix. Hence, we have ‖∆‖F ≤ η. If the
attacker’s goal is to increase the importance of feature i, our
problem can be written as
max
‖cd⊤‖F≤η
: |βˆi| (39)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
‖y − Xˆβ‖2,
Xˆ = X+ cd⊤.
If the adversary is trying to minimize the magnitude of the ith
regression coefficient, our problem is
min
‖cd⊤‖F≤η
: |βi| (40)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖y− Xˆβ‖2,
Xˆ = X+ cd⊤.
Similar to Section II-B, the solutions to problems (39) and (40)
can be obtained by the solutions to the following two prob-
lems:
max
‖cd⊤‖F≤η
: βˆi (41)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖y− Xˆβ‖2,
Xˆ = X+ cd⊤.
and
min
‖cd⊤‖F≤η
: βˆi (42)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖y− Xˆβ‖2,
Xˆ = X+ cd⊤.
We can further write the above two problems in a more unified
form:
min
‖cd⊤‖F≤η
: e⊤βˆ (43)
s.t. βˆ = argmin
β
: ‖y− Xˆβ‖2,
Xˆ = X+ cd⊤.
If e = ei, in which ei is a vector with the ith entry being
1 and all other entries being zero, problem (43) is equivalent
to problem (42). If e = −ei, problem (43) is equivalent to
problem (41). Hence, in the following part, we will focus on
solving this unified problem (43).
To solve problem (43), we can first solve the lower level
optimization problem in the constraints, where it admits a
simple solution that βˆ = Xˆ†y and X† is the pseudo-inverse
of X. Different from the adding one data point case discussed
in Section II, this pseudo-inverse does not have a simple
expression in terms of c, d and X. However, this pseudo-
inverse can be written as Xˆ† = X†+G, where G depends on
c, d, and X. To write the expression of Xˆ† in a more compact
way, we first introduce the following notations:
γ = 1 + d⊤X†c, v = X†c,
n = (X†)⊤d, w = (I−XX†)c.
Furthermore, we assume that the feature matrix has full col-
umn rank. Depending on the values of w and γ, the expression
of G can be divided into the following four cases [28]:
Case 1: when ‖w‖ = 0, γ 6= 0,
G = − 1
γ
vn⊤; (44)
Case 2: when ‖w‖ 6= 0, γ = 0,
G = − 1‖n‖2X
†nn⊤ − 1‖w‖2vw
⊤; (45)
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Case 3: when ‖w‖ 6= 0, γ 6= 0,
G =
1
γ
X†nw⊤
− γ‖n‖2‖w‖2 + γ2
(‖w‖2
γ
X†n+ v
)(‖n‖2
γ
w + n
)⊤
;
(46)
Case 4: when ‖w‖ = 0, γ = 0,
G = − 1‖v‖2vv
⊤X† − 1‖n‖2X
†nn⊤ +
v⊤X†n
‖v‖2‖n‖2vn
⊤.
(47)
Since βˆ = Xˆ†y = (X† +G)y and X† does not depend on c
and d, our problem is equivalent to
min
c,d
: e⊤Gy (48)
s.t. ‖c · d⊤‖F ≤ η.
Suppose (c∗,d∗) is the optimal solution of (48), it is easy to
see that for nonzero k, (kc∗,d∗/k) is also a valid optimal
solution. To avoid the ambiguity, it is necessary and possible
to further reduce the feasible region. Hence, we put an extra
constraint on c, where we restrict the norm of c to be less
than or equal to 1. As the result, our problem can be further
written as
min
c,d
: e⊤Gy (49)
s.t. ‖c‖ ≤ 1,
‖d‖ ≤ η,
in which we use the identity ‖cd⊤‖F = ‖c‖‖d‖. It is clear
that problem (48) and problem (49) have the same optimal
objective value.
SinceG is decided by c, d, andX, different values of c and
d may result in different objective functions. As we have seen
the expression of G can be divided into four different cases,
we will discuss these cases one by one in the following.
Before further discussion, let us assume the singular value
decomposition of the original feature matrix is X = UΣV⊤,
where Σ = [diag(σ1, σ2, · · · , σm),0]⊤ and σ1 ≥ σ2 ≥ · · · ≥
σm > 0. With this decomposition, we have X
† = VΣ†U⊤,
where Σ† = [diag(σ−11 , σ
−1
2 , · · · , σ−1m ),0].
In Case 1 (44), if η ≥ σm, by letting γ → 0, we
have our objective being minus infinity by setting (c,d) =
(um,−σmvm) or (c,d) = (−um, σdmvm), where um and
vm is the mth column of matrices U and V, respectively.
Hence, we conclude that, when η ≥ σm, the optimal value
of problem (49) is unbounded from below. As the result,
throughout this section, we assume η < σm. Thus, we have
γ = 1 + d⊤X†c ≥ 1 − ‖c · d⊤‖‖X†‖ ≥ 1 − ησm > 0. As
γ 6= 0, we don’t need to consider Case 2 and Case 4. Actually,
Case 1 is a special case of Case 3. In particular, setting w = 0
in Case 3, we recover Case 1. Based on these discussion, we
only need to solve the problem in Case 3. Let h denote our
Algorithm 3 Optimal Rank-one Attack Matrix Design via the
Alternating Optimization Algorithm
1: Input: data set {yi,xi}ni=1 and energy budget η.
2: Initialize: randomly initialize c0 and d0, set number of
iterations k = 0.
3: compute G according to (46).
4: plug in the expression of G into (49), and obtain our
objective, h(c,d), as in (50).
5: Do
6: update ck by solving: ck = argmin
‖c‖≤1
: h(c,dk−1),
7: update dk by solving: dk = argmin
‖d‖≤η
: h(ck,d),
8: set k = k + 1,
9: While convergence conditions are not meet.
10: compute the modification matrix ∆ = ck(dk)⊤.
11: Output: return the modification matrix, ∆.
objective h(c,d) = e⊤Gy, plug in the expression of G, and
we have
h(c,d) =
1
‖n‖2‖w‖2 + γ2
(
γe⊤X†nw⊤y − γe⊤vn⊤y
− ‖w‖2e⊤X†nn⊤y − ‖n‖2e⊤vw⊤y). (50)
We need to optimize h(c,d) over c and d with the constraint
‖c‖ ≤ 1 and ‖d‖ ≤ η. However, h(c,d) is a ratio of two
quartic functions, which is known to be hard non-convex
problem in general. To solve this problem, similar to [20],
we can use the projected gradient descent method (Please see
Appendix B for details). However, it is hard to choose a proper
stepsize and its convergence is not clear when the projected
gradient descent is used on a non-convex problem. In the
following, we provide an alternating optimization algorithm
with provable convergence guarantee.
The enabling observation of our approach is that, even
though the optimization problem is a complex non-convex
problem, for a fixed c, h is a ratio of two quadratic functions
with respect to d. Similarly, for a fixed d, h is a ratio of two
quadratic functions with respect to c. Ratio of two quadratic
functions admits a hidden convex structure [29]. Inspired by
this, we decompose our optimization variables into c and d,
and then use alternating optimization algorithm described in
Algorithm 3 to sequentially optimize c and d.
The core of this algorithm is to solve the following two
problems
ck = argmin
‖c‖≤1
: h(c,dk−1), (51)
and
dk = argmin
‖d‖≤η
: h(ck,d). (52)
For a fixed d, the objective of problem (51) becomes h(c,d) =
h1(c)/h2(c), where we omit the superscript of d,
h1(c) = c
⊤
[
e⊤X†nny⊤(I−XX†)− n⊤yne⊤X†
− e⊤X†nn⊤y(I−XX†)− ‖n‖2(X†)⊤ey⊤(I−XX†)]c
+
[
e⊤X†n(I−XX†)y − n⊤y(X†)⊤e]⊤c, (53)
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and
h2(c) =c
⊤
[‖n‖2(I−XX†) + nn⊤]c+ 2n⊤c+ 1. (54)
Hence, problem (51) can be written as:
min
c
:
h1(c)
h2(c)
(55)
s.t. ‖c‖ ≤ 1, (56)
where the forms of hi(c) = c
⊤Aic+2b
⊤
i c+ li, i = 1, 2 and
Ai, bi and li can be derived from (53) and (54). The objective
of this problem is the ration of two quadratic functions.
Even though it is non-convex, it has certain hidden convex
structures. The following theorem characterizes its optimal
solution by solving a semidefinite programming [29].
Theorem 1. The optimal value of problem (55) is the same
as the following optimal value
max
α, ν≥0
: α (57)
s.t.
[
A1 b1
b⊤1 l1
]
 α
[
A2 b2
b⊤2 l2
]
− ν
[
I 0
0 −1
]
Proof. First, we will show that there exists µ ≥ 0 such that[
A2 b2
b⊤2 l2
]
+ µ
[
I 0
0 −1
]
≻ 0. (58)
To prove the left hand side of (58) is positive definite, we
can show the following two inequalities are true according to
Schur complement condition for positive definite matrix
l2 − µ > 0, (59)
A2 + µI− 1
1− µb2b
⊤
2 > 0, (60)
where l2 = 1. Plug in the expression of A2, the left hand of
inequality (60) can be written as
A2 + µI− 1
1− µb2b
⊤
2
= ‖n‖2(I−XX†) + µI− µ
1− µnn
⊤.
Since I − XX† is a projection matrix, it is positive semi-
definite. So, we only need to prove
µI− µ
1− µnn
⊤ ≻ 0. (61)
Since nn⊤ is rank-one and its non-zero eigenvalue is ‖n‖2,
it equals to proving ‖n‖2/(1 − µ) < 1. To guarantee this
inequality, we only need to make sure µ < 1 − ‖n‖2. Since
‖X†‖ ≤ 1/σm and ‖d‖ ≤ η, we get ‖n‖2 = ‖(X†)⊤d‖2 ≤
‖X†‖2‖d‖2 ≤ η2/σ2m < 1. By choosing 0 < µ < 1−‖n‖2 <
1, we can ensure (59) and (60) are both satisfied, and hence
inequality (58) is satisfied.
As inequality (58) holds, we have h2(c) > 0. It can be
verified by the fact that left multiplying [c⊤, 1] and right
multiplying [c⊤, 1]⊤ result in h2(c) > µ(1 − c⊤c) > 0.
So, our objective, h(c,d), is well defined. Using the same
technique that transforms problem (14) to (16), we can further
convert (55) to a quadratic constrained quadratic programming.
Further analysis reveals when (58) holds, the feasible set of
this quadratic constraint quadratic programming is compact.
So, the minimum is attainable. Thus, we can solve it through
is its dual problem (57). For the rest of the proof, please refer
to [29] for details.
From Theorem 1, we know the optimal value of (55). We
now discuss how to find optimal c to achieve this value.
Suppose the optimal solution of problem (57) is (α∗, ν∗).
Since, h2(c) > 0, we have h1(c) ≥ α∗h2(c) for any feasible
c. Hence, we can compute the optimal solution of problem (55)
by solving
argmin
c
: h1(c)− α∗h2(c) (62)
s.t. ‖c‖2 ≤ 1 (63)
This problem is just a trust region problem. There are several
existing methods to solve it efficiently. In this paper, we
employ the method describe in [30].
Now, we turn to solve problem (52). Since (52) and (51)
have similar structure, we can employ the methods described
in Theorem 1 and (62) to find its optimal value and optimal
solution for problem (52).
Until now, we have fully described how to solve the
intermediate problems in the alternating optimization method.
The following theorem shows that the proposed alternating
optimization algorithm will converge. Suppose the generated
sequence of solution is {ck, dk}, k = 0, 1, · · · , and we have
the following theorem:
Theorem 2. The sequence {ck, dk} admits a limit point
{c¯ , d¯} and we have
lim
k→∞
h(ck,dk) = h(c¯, d¯). (64)
Furthermore, every limit point is a critical point, which means
∇h(c¯, d¯)⊤
[
c− c¯
d− d¯
]
≥ 0, (65)
for any ‖c‖ ≤ 1 and ‖d‖ ≤ η.
Proof. We first give the proof of (64). Since the sequence
{ck,dk} lies in the compact sets, {(c,d) | ‖c‖ ≤ 1, ‖d‖ ≤
η}, and according to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [31],
{ck,dk} must have limit points. So, there is a subsequence
of {hk} which converges to h(c¯, d¯). As the objective is a
continuous function with respect to c and d, the compactness
of the constraint also implies the sequence of the objective
value, {hk}, is bounded from below. In addition, {hk} is a
non-increasing sequence, which indicates that the sequence of
the function value must converge. In summary, the sequence
{hk} must converge to h(c¯, d¯). For the rest of the proof, please
refer to Corollary 2 of [32] for more details.
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In this subsection, we test our adversarial attack strategies
on a practical regression problem. In this regression task, we
use seven international indexes to predict the returns of the
Istanbul Stock Exchange [33]. The data set contains 536 data
samples, which are the records of the returns of Istanbul Stock
Exchange with seven other international indexes starting from
Jun. 5, 2009 to Feb. 22, 2011.
8
00.5
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
original
proposed
random
(a)
0
0.5
1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
original
proposed
random
(b)
Fig. 1. The regression coefficients under our proposed and random attacks.
The left figure shows the regression coefficients before and after attacking the
fourth coefficient with objective (5) and the right one shows the regression
coefficients before and after attacking the fifth coefficient with objective (3).
A. Attacking one specific regression coefficient
We first show the results for attacking one specific regres-
sion coefficient. The results are shown in Fig. 1. In the figure,
the x-axis denotes the index of the regression coefficients and
the y-axis indicates the value of the regression coefficients.
We design our first experiment to attack the fourth regression
coefficient and try to make it small by solving problem (5). We
use two strategies to attack this coefficient with fixed energy
budget η = 0.2. The first strategy is the one proposed in this
paper. As a comparison, we also use a random strategy. In the
random strategy, we randomly generate the adversarial data
point with each entry being i.i.d. generated from a standard
normal distribution. Then, we normalize its energy to be η. We
repeat this random attack 10000 times and select the one with
the smallest value of the fourth regression coefficient. In the
second experiment, we intend to make the absolute value of
the fifth regression coefficient small. We compare the proposed
and the random attack strategies to attack the fifth coefficient
with fixed energy budget η = 0.1. Similarly, for the random
attack strategy, we run 10000 times random attacks and select
the one with the smallest absolute value of the fifth regression
coefficient.
Fig. 1 (a) shows the regression coefficients before and
after the first experiment and Fig. 1 (b) shows the regression
coefficients before and after the second experiment. From the
figures we can see that our proposed adversarial attack strategy
is much more efficient than the random attack strategy. One
can also observe that by only adding one adversarial example,
designed using the approach characterized in this paper, one
can dramatically change the value of a regression coefficient
and hence change the importance of that explanatory variable.
B. Attacking without changing untargeted regression coeffi-
cients too much
From the numerical examples in the previous subsection, we
can see the untargeted regression coefficients may change dra-
matically while we attacking one specific regression coefficient
with an adversarial data point. For example, as demonstrated
in Fig. 1, the sixth and seventh regression coefficients change
significantly when we attack the fourth and fifth regression
coefficients. To mitigate the undesirable changes of untargeted
regression coefficients, we need more sophisticated attacking
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Fig. 2. Attack the fourth regression coefficient with objective (31) and with
different energy budgets.
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Fig. 3. The regression coefficients after different kinds of strategies that attack
the fourth regression coefficient with energy budget η = 1.
strategies. In this subsection, we will test different strategies
with a more general objective function as demonstrated in
Section II-C. We also use the same data set as described
in the previous subsection. We first try to attack the fourth
regression coefficient to increase its importance while making
only small changes to the rest of the regression coefficients.
To accomplish this task, we aim to solve problem (31) with
λ = −1. Given the energy budget, firstly, we use our
semidefinite relaxation based algorithm to solve problem (38),
and then follow Algorithm 2 to find the adversarial data point.
For comparison, we also carry out the random attack strategy,
in which we randomly generate the data point with each
entry being i.i.d. according to the standard normal distribution.
Then, we normalize its energy being η and added it to the
original data points. We repeat these random attacks 10000
times and select the one with the smallest objective value.
The third strategy is the projected gradient descent based
strategy, where we use projected gradient descent algorithm
to solve (38) and follow similar steps of Algorithm 2 to find
the adversarial data point. Projected gradient descent works
much like the gradient descent except with an additional
operation that projects result of each step onto the feasible
set after moving in the direction of negative gradient [34].
We have described the general projected gradient descent
algorithm in Appendix B and Algorithm 4. In our experiment,
we use diminishing stepsize, αt = 1/(t + 1). Since the
projected gradient descent algorithm depends on the initial
points heavily, given the energy budget, we repeat it 100 times
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Fig. 4. Attack the sixth regression coefficient with objective (31) under
different energy budgets.
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Fig. 5. The regression coefficients after different kinds of strategies that attack
the sixth regression coefficient with energy budget η = 1.
with different random initial points and treat the average of
its objective values as the objective value of this algorithm.
Fig. 2 shows the objective values under different energy
budgets with different attacking strategies and Fig. 3 demon-
strates the regression coefficients after one of the attacks of
different strategies with η = 1. In these figures, ‘orig’ is the
original regression coefficient, ‘grad’ denotes the projected
gradient descent algorithm, ‘rand’ means the random strategy,
and ‘poly’ indicates the our semidefinite relaxation strategy.
From these two figures, we can see our semidefinite relax-
ation based strategy performs much better than the other two
strategies. In addition, in our experiment, our semidefinite
relaxation method with relaxation order 2 or 3 can always
lead to the global optimal solutions. Hence, the computational
complexity of this method is still low. Fig. 3 also shows our
relaxation based method leads to the largest magnitude of the
fourth regression coefficient while keeping other regression
coefficients almost unchanged.
In the second experiment, we attack the sixth regression
coefficient and attempt to make its magnitude small while
keeping the change of the rest of coefficients to be small. So,
we set λ = 1 in problem (31) to achieve this goal. The settings
of each strategy is similar to the ones in the first experiment.
Fig. 4 shows the objective values with different strategies
under different energy budgets and Fig. 5 demonstrates the re-
gression coefficients after one of the attacks of those strategies
respectively with energy budget η = 1. From Fig. 4 we know
the projected gradient descent based strategy and semidefinite
relaxation based strategy achieve much lower objective values
compared to the random attack strategy. Specifically, when the
energy budget is smaller than 0.7, both of the two strategies
behave similarly. However, when the energy budget is larger
than 0.7, the projected gradient descent based strategy leads
to larger objective value as the energy budget grows. This
is because the projected gradient descent algorithm tends to
find solutions at the boundary of the feasible set. By contrast,
our semidefinite relaxation based strategy can find the global
optimal solutions with relaxation order 2 or 3. Thus, it gives
the best performance among the three strategies. Fig. 5 also
demonstrates our relaxation based method achieves the global
optimum when η = 1 as the it leads the sixth regression
coefficient to zero and other regression coefficients to be
unchanged.
C. Rank-one attack
In this subsection, we carry out different rank-one attack
strategies. Our goal is to minimize the magnitude of the fourth
regression coefficient with objective (42). We compare two
strategies: the projected gradient descent based strategy dis-
cussed in Section IV-B and our proposed alternating optimiza-
tion based strategy. For the projected gradient descent based
strategies, we use different step sizes: 1/(1 + t), 10/(1 + t),
and 100/(1 + t). As our analysis shows, when the energy
budget is larger than the smallest singular value, our objective
can be minus infinity. Hence, in our experiment, we vary the
energy budget from 0 to the smallest singular value. Given
certain energy budget, we set all the algorithms with the
same randomly initialized point and run these algorithms until
they stop with the same convergence condition that is two
consecutive function values change too small or it reaches the
maximal allowable iterations. We repeat this process 100 times
and record their average objective values, iterations, and run
times when they converge.
Fig. 6 shows the average objective values, the number of
iterations, and the run time of the four algorithms, where
GD-1, GD-10 and GD-100 stand for the projected gradient
descent with stepsize 1/(1 + t), 10/(1 + t), and 100/(1 + t),
respectively, and AO denotes the proposed alternating opti-
mization method. As Fig. 6 shows, when the energy budget
increases, the objectives decrease for both of these algorithms.
Furthermore, the proposed alternating optimization based algo-
rithm provides much smaller objective values, especially when
the energy budget approaches the smallest singular value. As
the energy budget increases, the total iterations and run times
of alternating optimization, GD-1, and GD-10 increase. One
notable thing is that the proposed alternating optimization
based algorithm converges several orders of magnitude faster
than the projected gradient descent based algorithms. However,
as the energy budget increases, the iterations and run times of
GD-100 first decrease and then increase. This is due to the
fact that a larger stepsize will result in a faster convergence
rate while it may cause oscillation. This phenomena can be
observed in Fig. 7, where it depicts the evolution of the ob-
jective values of AO and GD-100 with the energy budget being
η/σm = 0.5, η/σm = 0.9 and η/σm = 0.95, respectively, and
σm is the smallest singular value of the original feature matrix.
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Fig. 6. Comparison of the projected gradient descent with different stepsizes and the proposed alternating optimization method. (a) shows the average objective
values of different algorithms under different energy budget. (b) demonstrates the average iterations that reach the convergence condition and (c) illustrates
the average run times of each algorithm.
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Fig. 7. These figures show the evolution of function values as the iteration increases with one typical run of projected gradient descent and alternating
optimization algorithm, where (a) is with η/σm = 0.5, (b) is with η/σm = 0.9, and (c) is with η/σm = 0.95 and σm is the smallest singular value of the
original feature matrix.
From this figure we can see as the energy budget increases, the
alternating optimization based algorithm converges very fast
while the projected gradient descent based algorithm becomes
unstable when the energy budget is large.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the adversarial robustness
of linear regression problems. Particularly, we have given the
closed-form solution when we attack one specific regression
coefficient with limited energy budget. Furthermore, we have
considered a more complex objective where we attack one
of the regression coefficient while trying to keep the rest of
regression coefficients to be unchanged. We have formulated
this problem as a multivariate polynomial optimization prob-
lem and introduced the semidefinite relaxation method to solve
it. Finally, we have studied a more powerful adversary who
can make rank-one modification on the feature matrix. To take
the advantage of the rank-one structure, we have proposed an
alternating optimization algorithm to solve this problem. The
numerical examples demonstrated that our proposed closed-
form solution and the semidefinite relaxation based strategies
can find the global optimal solutions and the alternating
optimization based strategy provides better solutions, faster
convergence, and more stable behavior compared to the pro-
jected gradient descent based strategy.
In terms of future work, it is of interest to study how to
design multiple adversarial data points and how to efficiently
design the modification matrix without the rand-one constraint.
APPENDIX A
LASSERRES RELAXATION METHOD FOR SOLVING (38)
In this appendix, we briefly introduce Lasserre’s relaxation
method and use this method to solve problem (38). Lasserre’s
relaxation method is dedicated to solve multivariate polyno-
mial optimization problem. A general multivariate polynomial
optimization problem contains a multivariate polynomial ob-
jective function, p(x) : Rn → R, and some constraints defined
by polynomial inequalities, gi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , r:
min : p(x) (66)
s.t. gi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , r. (67)
Clearly, our optimization problem (38) can be viewed a
multivariate polynomial optimization problem, since in (38)
the objective function is a fourth order multivariate polynomial
and the constraint is a quadratic polynomial.
To proceed, let us explain more details about the problem.
The polynomial in the objective, p(x), can be written as:
p(x) =
∑
α
pαx
α, (68)
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where α ∈ Nn,
xα =
n∏
i=1
xα
i
i , (69)
and |α| = ∑i αi. Suppose the order of the objective
function is m0, we have |α| ≤ m0. Define pα =
{pα} ∈ Rs(m0) as the coefficients of the polynomial basis
{1, x1, x2, . . . , xn, x21, x1x2, . . . , xm0n }. Hence, the dimension
of the basis is s(m0) =
(
n+m0
m0
)
. Instead of directly solving
problem (66), Lasserre’s relaxation method [24] first converts
it into the following equivalent problem
min
µ∈P(K)
:
∫
p(x) d(µ(x)), (70)
where K is the semialgebraic set defined by the inequalities:
K = {x | gi(x) ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , r}, and P(K) is the set of
all probability measures supported on K.
To see that problem (66) and (70) are equivalent, suppose
the optimal values of (66) and (70) are p∗0 and p
∗, respec-
tively. Since p(x) ≥ p∗0, we have p∗ ≥ p∗0. Conversely, suppose
the optimal solution of (66) is x∗, µ = δx∗ is a feasible
solution to (70). Hence, we also have p∗ ≤ p∗0. Thus, the two
problems are equivalent.
With the help of this reformulation, finding the global
optimal points for (66) is equivalent to finding the optimal dis-
tribution of (70). Since
∫
p(x) dµ(x) =
∑
α pα
∫
xα dµ(x),
the objective function of (70) is just p⊤αyα, where yα = {yα}
and yα =
∫
xα dµ(x). So, finding the optimal probability
is identical to finding the optimal yα under the constraint
that yα is a valid moment sequence with respect to some
probability measure on K. The solution to this problem is
fully characterized by the K-moment problem in case K is
compact. Let us give more notations for the convenience of
introducing this method.
Given an s(2m) length vector, yα = {yα}, with its first
element y0,...,0 = 1. The s(m) dimensional moment matrix
Mm(y) is constructed as follows: the first row and columns
is defined as Mm(1, k) = yαk and Mm(k, 1) = yαk for k =
1, 2, . . . , s(m) and Mm(i, j) = yαi+αj for i, j = 2, . . . , s(m).
For instance, when n = 2,m = 2,
Mm(y) =


1 y10 y01 y20 y11 y02
y10 y20 y11 y30 y21 y12
y01 y11 y02 y21 y12 y03
y20 y30 y21 y40 y31 y22
y11 y21 y12 y31 y22 y13
y02 y12 y03 y22 y13 y04


.
Moreover, Mm(y) defines a bi-linear form, 〈· , ·〉, on two
polynomials
〈p, q〉y = 〈p,Mm(y)q〉 =
∑
α
(pq)αyα =
∫
p(x)q(x) dµ(x).
So, if yα is a sequence of moments of some probability
measure, we have
〈q, q〉y =
∫
q(x)2 d(µ(x)) ≥ 0.
Thus, we have Mm(y) < 0. Let p(x) be a multivariate
polynomial with coefficient vector pβ = {pβ}, and define
the localizing matrix Mm(py) as
Mm(py)(i, j) =
∑
β
pβyαi+αj+β .
For example, with
M1(y) =

 1 y10 y01y10 y20 y11
y01 y11 y02

 and p(x) = a− x21 − x22,
we have
M1(py) =
 a− y20 − y02 ay10 − y30 − y12 ay01 − y21 − y03ay10 − y30 − y12 ay20 − y40 − y22 ay11 − y31 − y13
ay01 − y21 − y03 ay11 − y31 − y13 ay01 − y22 − y04

 .
Also, if p(x) ≥ 0, by definition, we have Mm(py) < 0.
Further, we make the following assumption on the semial-
gebraic set K.
Assumption 1. The set K is compact and there exists a real-
valued polynomial u(x): Rn → R such that {u(x) ≥ 0} is
compact and
u(x) = u0(x) +
r∑
k=1
gi(x)ui(x) for all x ∈ Rn, (71)
where the polynomial ui(x) is the sum of squares for i =
0, 1, . . . , r.
Assumption 1 is satisfied in many cases. For example, this
assumption is satisfied when there is only one inequality con-
straint that is compact, which is the case in our problem (38).
With the help of the notations and Assumption 1, we have
the main result. Let wi = ⌈mi/2⌉, wheremi, i = 1, 2, . . . , r, is
the order of gi(x) and m0 is the order of the objective, with
N ≥ max{wi} for i = 0, 1, . . . , r. Consider the following
semidefinite programming
min :
∑
α
pαyα (72)
s.t. MN(y) < 0,
MN−wi(giy) < 0, i = 1, 2, . . . , r,
where N is called the relaxation order. Lasserre [24] shows
that as N approaches infinity, the solution of (72) converges
to the solution of (70). However, the dimension of the semidef-
inite programming (72) grows rapidly as N increases and
infinite N makes solving problem (72) infeasible. Fortunately,
in practice, a small N is enough to get a very good ap-
proximation of problem (70) [24]. Furthermore, a small N is
usually sufficient to get the global optimal solutions and the
sufficient rank condition, rankMN(y) = rankMN−wmax(y),
where wmax = max{wi}, i = 0, 1, . . . , r, assures the global
optimality. Therefore, after we solving problem (72) we are
ready to check whether we reach the global optimality. Be-
sides, Henrion and Lasserre developed a systematic way to
extract all the optimal solutions in case the rank condition is
satisfied [35]. Since our problem (38) is just a special case
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Algorithm 4 The Projected Gradient Descent Algorithm
1: Input: objective function f(x), feasible set C, and stepsize
parameter αt.
2: Initialize: randomly initialize x0 ∈ C and set the number
of iterations t = 0.
3: Do
4: compute the gradient: ∇f(xt),
5: update: yt = xt − αt∇f(xt),
6: project yt onto the feasible set: xt+1 = argmin
x∈C
: ‖x−yt‖.
7: set t = t+ 1,
8: While convergence conditions are not meet.
9: Output: xt.
of multivariate polynomial optimization, with the help of this
relaxation method, we can solve problem (38).
APPENDIX B
THE PROJECTED GRADIENT DESCENT ALGORITHM
In this section, we describe the general projected gradient
descent algorithm. Projected gradient descent algorithm is a
way to solve the constrained optimization problem. So, it
can be used to solve our problem as (38) and (49) are both
constrained optimization problems. At each step of projected
gradient descent, we first compute the gradient of the objective
function, move forward to the negative gradient direction,
and then project onto the feasible set. We continue this
process until meet the convergence criteria. When performing
the projected gradient descent algorithm, we need to pay
close attention to the stepsize parameter. Appropriate constant
stepsize will lead to convergent algorithm if the objective
is Lipschitz convex. However, diminishing stepsize is more
proper for non-convex objective functions [34]. We summarize
the general projected gradient descent method in Algorithm 4.
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